


vl-e



virtual laboratory for e-science



BiG Grid

the dutch e-science grid

Grid Security on a global scale

Oscar Koeroo @

eth-0





index

- Intro (wie, wat, waar?)
- Grid Computing
 - Wat? Hoe?
- Hoe zit de security in elkaar
 - End-to-End security
 - De uitdagingen

Wie ben ik?

nerdtest-score: 89

- Security middleware developer
 - Van afstudeerproject in 2003...
 - European Data Grid (tot 2003)
 - EGEE, EGEE-II en EGEE-III (tot april 2010)
 - ... en verder
- Werkzaam in diverse middleware groepen
 - Algemene security implementaties
 - Standaardisatie groepen
 - Actief in interoperability tussen Grid infra



Overall te vinden

Overal te vinden




Overall te vinden






Overall te vinden




FOM institute
for subatomic physics

Nikhef




Nikhef samenwerkingsverband



● FOM instituut voor subatomaire fysica

Nikhef samenwerkingsverband



● universiteiten

● instituten

● FOM instituut voor subatomaire fysica

● Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen


● Universiteit van Amsterdam

● Vrije universiteit Amsterdam

● Universiteit Utrecht



deeltjesfysica
(effectief: LHC)




 **ATLAS**
EXPERIMENT

Jet Event at 2.36 TeV Collision Energy


2009-12-14, 04:30 CET, Run 142308, Event 482137

<http://atlas.web.cern.ch/Atlas/public/EVTDISPLAY/events.html>

astrodeeltjesfysica






astrodeeltjesfysica



ANTARES
deep-sea
water-Cerenkov
neutrino telescope

AUGER
large area
cosmic ray
observatory





Theory

$$\begin{aligned} & 1 + \frac{25}{4}H_{1,1,1} + \frac{13}{2}H_{-2}\zeta_2 + \frac{27}{2}H_{-2,0,0} + \frac{11}{2}H_{-3,0,0} + \frac{13}{2}H_{-2,2} \\ & H_{1,1,1} - \frac{3}{4}H_4 - \frac{1}{4}H_{0,0}\zeta_2 + H_{1,2} + \frac{11}{2}H_{1,1,0} + \frac{79}{12}H_{2,0} + \frac{67}{8}H_{-1,1} \\ & - \frac{305}{12}H_{-1,0} - 24H_0\zeta_3 + H_{-1}\zeta_2 - \frac{13375}{72}H_0 - \frac{1889}{18} - 38H_{-1,1} \\ & - \frac{7}{2}H_{-2,0} + \frac{79}{72}\zeta_2 + \frac{4}{3}H_1\zeta_2 + \frac{17}{12}H_{1,1,1} + \frac{17}{12}H_0\zeta_2 + \frac{31}{18}H_{0,0} \\ & \left. \right) + 16C_F n_f^2 \left(\frac{7}{6}H_{0,0,0} + \frac{11}{36}H_1 - \frac{739}{96} + \frac{163}{24}H_0 + \frac{7}{24}H_0 \right. \\ & \left. \frac{5}{18}H_{1,0} + \frac{5}{9}\zeta_2 + \frac{1}{6}p_{\text{qg}}(x) \left[H_{2,1} + \frac{91}{2} - \frac{35}{3}H_0 - \frac{22}{3}H_{0,0} + H_{0,1} \right. \right. \\ & \left. \left. H_1 \right] + \frac{77}{81} \left(\frac{1}{x} - x^2 \right) + (1-x) \left[\frac{1}{12}H_1 - \frac{6463}{432} - 4H_{0,0,0,0} - \frac{16}{3} \right. \right. \\ & \left. \left. - \frac{7}{3}x\zeta_2 \right] - (1+x) \left[\frac{3475}{72}H_0 + \frac{103}{36}H_{0,0} \right] \right) + 16C_F^2 n_c \left(p_{\text{qg}}(x) \right. \end{aligned}$$

Grid computing



BiG Grid

the dutch e-science grid



news

HOME NIEUWS LIFESTYLE FINANCIËEL

BINNENLAND BUITENLAND SPORT PRIVE SNELNIEUWS VIDEO DIGITAAL WEER

News Business Money Ent

Breaking News National W

Broadband network s

By Ryan Emery
April 07, 2008 03:44am

BY the time Australia upgrades
could be obsolete - thanks to a

in G

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De Telegraaf Digitaal

Zoek in

deze site Internet

powered by Google™

GAMES

HOME > NIEUWS > DIGITAAL

ma 07 apr 2008, 12:29

Internet binnenkort 10.000 keer sneller

door onze redactie

10:44 Zoon aangezien voor kalkoen

AMSTERDAM - Het internet zoals wij dat kennen kan binnenkort

nder zijn. De wetenschappers die aan de

it huidige internet zijn namelijk bezig met e

keer sneller zal zijn dan het snelste huidi

van de

et

s

e

loaden.

n CERN

aatste

elle

dit

an de

erneller

entrum CERN," zegt professor David Britto

den is aan de universiteit van Glasgow in d

ontdekte men in Zw

C), de nieuwe deel

veer net zoveel als

slagen, dat daard

Make sure you're coming to you

BEST CONSUMER ONLINE PUBLISHER

Travel Jobs Motoring Telegraph TV SEARCH

collapse as video demand soars

04/2008

a halt within two years under the pressure of booming demand

ave warned.

y replace world wide web

WPROGIDS

Oersoep, iemand?

webwereld

ALTIJD HET LAATSTE ICT-NIEUWS

Gebruikersnaam

Tip ons Archief Whitepapers Nie

Nieuws Column Video Dossier Blog Beveiliging ...

Markt & onderzoek Nieuws

Nederland grote hulp bij grid-project

Dinsdag 26 april 2005, 15:54 - Acht computercentra, waaronder het Nederlandse Sara, zijn met elkaar verbonden om binnen tien dagen 500 terabyte aan data uit te wisselen.

Door Edwin Feldmann

Bij het zogeheten LHC Computing Grid-project zijn diverse Nederlandse instellingen betrokken waaronder het Nederlandse Sara en het Nikhef. De centra gaan de Large Hadron Collider (LHC) testen.

Doel van het project is om voldoende reken-, opslag- en netwerkfaciliteiten te verschaffen om wetenschappelijke experimenten te laten slagen.

De verbindingen zullen binnen tien dagen ononderbroken gegevens uitwisselen met een gemiddelde snelheid van 600 MBps. In totaal zal er aan het einde ongeveer 500 terabyte (512.000 gigabyte) aan data zijn verstuurd. "Wanneer er gebruik zou zijn gemaakt van een eenvoudige 512 Kbps-verbinding zou hiervoor 250 jaar nodig zijn", aldus de organisatie.

Onderzoekers staan te dringen om plaatsje op Nederlands wetenschappelijk grid

■ BIG GRID officieel gelanceerd

Op het BIG GRID-lanceringsfeest leken de aanwezigen elkaar de loef af te willen steken met de vele petabytes (1000 TB) die ze genereren met hun onderzoek. Een ding was duidelijk: een onderzoeksgrid voor opslag en verwerking van al die data is hard nodig. Er wordt aan gewerkt. Twee jaar geleden werd er door de rector van de universiteit van Glasgow ge-

Een snel netwerk is de basis voor BIG GRID. Met het Nederlandse SURFnet is dat er al. Daar hangt al de nodige apparatuur aan, zoals de nieuwe SARA-supercomputer, die al op gridachtige wijze wordt gebruikt en gedeeltelijk uit de pot van BIG GRID is betaald. Die infrastructuur en apparatuur worden in de komende jaren aangevuld tot een grootschalig grid voor wetenschappelijk gebruik. Daarbij zijn ook industriële partners welkom, zoals Philips dat onderzoek doet aan beeldver-

Large Hadron Collider

27 km circumference

Lake Geneva

CMS

LHCb

ALICE

ATLAS

Large Hadron Collider

27 km circumference

Lake Geneva



LHCb



ALICE

ATLAS


Large Hadron Collider

27 km circumference

Lake Geneva



LHCb






ATLAS

ATLAS



The LHC Computing Challenge

- **The scale and complexity of the data**
→ **15 PetaBytes of new data each year**
- **The computing capacity to support 7,000 researchers all actively analysing the data**
→ **60'000 of (today's) fastest CPUs**
- **The way in which the data is accessed will depend on the physics that emerges**



Astronomy & Astrophysics



Astronomy & Astrophysics



Astronomy & Astrophysics

LOFAR large distributed radio telescope



Astronomy & Astrophysics


LOFAR large distributed radio telescope




Astronomy & Astrophysics

LOFAR large distributed radio telescope

AUGER & ARGO Cosmic Ray Observator



Functional MRI analysis




Storage of fMRI research data for sharing between groups and processing of image alignments

vl-e



Research work by:
 Silvia Olabbarriaga (AMC, UvA)
 Tristan Glatard (IvI, UvA)
 Abdullah Ozsoy (IvI, UvA)



In silico drug discovery

- Diseases such as HIV/AIDS, SRAS, Bird Flu, Malaria etc. are a threat to public health due to world wide exchanges and circulation of persons
- Grids open new perspectives to *in silico* drug discovery
 - Reduced cost and adding an accelerating factor in the search for new drugs


International collaboration is required for:

- Early detection
- Epidemiological watch
- Prevention
- Search for new drugs
- Search for vaccines



Areas reporting confirmed occurrence of H5N1* avian influenza in poultry and wild birds since 2003

Status as of 07 April 2005






Fusion

Commercial exploitation of fusion energy still needs to solve several outstanding problems requiring exceptional computing facilities including supercomputers and cluster-based grids

- Ion Kinetic Transport
- Massive Ray Tracing
- Stellarator Optimization

Interworking course-grained clusters and MPP systems across both the EGEE and DEISA grids



Grids in Science

The Grid is 'more of everything'
as science struggles to deal
with ever increasing complexity

more than one place on earth



more than one science!



more than one computer



more than ...

Three essential ingredients for Grid

'Access computing like the electrical power grid'

A grid combines resources that

- Are not managed by a single organization
- Use a common, open protocol ... that is general purpose
- Provide additional qualities of service, *i.e.*, are usable as a collective and transparent resource



What is Grid?



Cycle scavenging

- harvest idle compute power
- improve RoI on desktops




Cluster computing and storage


- What-if scenarios
- Physics event analysis
- Improve Data Centre Utilization

Cross-domain resource sharing

- more than one organization
- more than one application
- more than one ...
- open protocols
- collective service



What is Grid?



Cycle scavenging

- harvest idle compute power
- improve RoI on desktops




Cluster computing and storage

- What-if scenarios
- Physics event analysis
- Improve Data Centre Utilization

Cross-domain resource sharing

- more than one organization
- more than one application
- more than one ...
- open protocols
- collective service



e-Infrastructure for Research

World Wide Web (1990) – sharing information

Grid (1997) – sharing computers and storage

Clouds (2007) – commoditizing the Grid

more than one place on earth



What Makes
e-Research Happen ...


more than one computer



more than one science!


more than ...

Building Grid Infrastructures



- Protocols: common syntax and semantics for grid operations
- APIs: making grid concepts accessible from the applications
- Portals and workflows: bridging the end-user gap


Standards



- Standards, such as those by IETF, OASIS, OGF, &c aid interoperability and reduce vendor lock-in
- as you go higher up the stack, you get less synergy
 - Transport: IP/TCP, HTTP, TLS/SSL, &c well agreed
 - Web services: SOAP used to be the solution for all ...
... but 'Web 2.0' shows alternatives tailored to specific applications gaining popularity
 - Grid standards:
low-level job submission (BES, JSDL), management (DRMAA), basic security (OGSA-BSP Core, SC), high-level application toolkits (SAGA, GAT)

Working at scale

Grid is an error amplifier ...
'passive' controls are needed
to push work away
from failing resources



Failure-ping-pong – or *creeper and reaper* revisited

Resource information systems are the
backbone of any real-life grid


Grid is much like the 'Wild West'

- almost unlimited possibilities – but as a community plan for scaling issues, and a novel environment
- users and providers *need to interact* and articulate needs




eGEE
Enabling Grids
for E-science

Scheduled = 6849
Running = 10359



Making the Grid ...
the persistent e-Infrastructure

Different Communities build Different Grids



GridPP
UK Computing for Particle Physics

09:26:06 UTC

Enabling the Grid – the Network


TRIUMPH (CA)
USLHCNET

LHC Optical Private Network

10 000 Mbps dedicated
global networks



There's always a network close to you



NL Light




SURFnet pioneered 'lambda' and hybrid networks in the world

- and likely contributed to the creation of a market for 'dark fibre' in the Netherlands

There's always fibre within 2 miles from you – where ever you are!
(it's just that last mile to your home that's missing – and the business model of your telecom provider...)

Firewall



**"Firewall" by Sandy Smith,
www.computersforart.org**

Streams and Firewalls

- Data transfer target:
300 MByte/s out of CERN to **each** of the ~ 10 T1s
 - 24 GBit/s aggregate bandwidth
 - you cannot traverse firewalls at that speed
 - For those of you who still believe in firewalls
- OPN – an Optical Private Network for the LHC
 - internal routing only (BGP)
 - all participants sign up to a common policy
 - exclusively for data transfers
 - no direct connections to 'The Internet'




**"Firewall" by Sandy Smith,
www.computersforart.org**



BiG Grid

the dutch e-science grid



Philips Research Ehv

416 processor cores
126 TByte disk
1 Gbps networks

Nikhef (NDPF)


2550 processor cores
1 200 TByte disk
3x10 Gbps networks

SARA (GINA+LISA)

~2900 processor cores
850 TByte disk
1 500 TByte tape
4x 10 Gbps networks

RUG-CIT (Grid)

> 200 processor cores
34 TByte disk
10 Gbps networks




The physical upgrade of the Nikhef DC from...




Too...



Internal network (until mid 2009)




Internal network (late 2009)



Think BIG

Examples: CERN Computer Centre

- not only systems management
- but also asset mngt and facilities
- *and you are not even allowed to look inside Google's data centers!*



And Why Do We Need It?


**Enhanced Science needs more and more computations and
Collected data in science and industry grows exponentially**

The Bible	5 MByte
Your own digital photographs	5 MByte/image
Bio-informatics databases	500 GByte each
Refereed journal papers	1 TByte/yr
Satellite world imagery	5 TByte/yr
Large Synoptic Survey Telescope	30 Tbyte/day
Internet Archive 1996-2002	100 Tbyte
Web downloads for Google indexing	4 PByte/yr
Large Hadron Collider physics	20 PByte/yr
Astronomy tomorrow: SKA	365 PByte/yr


1 Petabyte = 1 000 000 000 Megabyte

Why Grid computing – today?

- New applications need larger amounts of **data** or **computation**
- Larger, and growing, distributed user community
- Network grows faster than compute power/storage




Typical grid topology for computational jobs




Virtual Organisations

The communities that make up the grid:

- **not under single hierarchical control**,
- (temporarily) **joining forces** to solve a particular problem at hand,
- bringing to the collaboration a subset of their resources,
- sharing those **at their discretion** and each **under their own conditions**.




VOs and the infrastructure




VO federation needs

- Trust establishment within the VO is separated in:
 - user identity (the user's *passport*)
 - group and roles within the VO (*visa*)
as these are different from a persons organizational role






Trust relationships

- For the VO model to work, parties need to (minimally) trust each other in their VO interactions
 - the alternative would be that every user would have to register at and **every** resource provider...



Authentication models

- > Direct user-to-site
 - > passwords, enterprise PKI, Kerberos
- > PKI with trusted third parties
- > Federated access
 - > Controlled & policy based
 - > Free-for-all, e.g., OpenID
- > Identity meta-system
 - > Infocard type systems

Trusted Third Party
(Certification Authority)



Relaying Party 1



Relaying Party 2





Relaying Party n




Authentication models

- > Direct user-to-site
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


- > PKI with trusted third parties

- > Federated access
 - > Controlled & policy based
 - > Free-for-all, e.g., OpenID



- > Identity meta-system
 - > Infocard type systems



User Identity

- Users and resources are typically part of more than one VO, but don't want many passwords
- Users and resource get a *single authentication token* (identity certificate)
 - that works across virtual organizations
 - issued by a party trusted by all ("CA"),
 - recognized by many resource providers, users, and VOs
 - satisfy traceability and persistency requirement
 - in itself does not grant any access, but provides a unique binding between an identifier and the subject

This is called your (*identity*) certificate

It is a *cryptographically protected statement* by the CA

- that you can use to prove your identity
in combination with a *private key* and its *passphrase*

Trusting the signature

- Paul's digital signature is safe if:
 1. Paul's private key is not compromised
 2. John knows Paul's public key
- How can John be sure that Paul's public key is really Paul's public key and not someone else's?
 - A *third party* guarantees the correspondence between public key and owner's identity.
 - Both A and B must trust this third party

Contacting the CA

- Each CA has different policies and practices
- Generate a cryptographic key pair
 - using a script like grid-cert-request
 - with your web browser
 - using jGridstart (Java Grid Start)
- Appear in-person to the Registration Authority (*RA*)
 - with a valid personal ID-card
- *RA* approves your request
- CA signs the approved request and sends you the cert
 - via mail: copy to your home directory
 - via the web: download into your browser and export to disk
 - via jGridstart: next -> next -> finish
- All use a network of *RAs* close to you

Your certificate (RFC 3280 / RFC 5280)

```
VisionMaster:~ okoeroo$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in ~/.globus/usercert.pem
```

Certificate:

Data:

Serial Number: 2812 (0xafc)

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C=NL, O=NIKHEF, CN=NIKHEF medium-security certification auth

Validity

Not Before: Dec 10 00:00:00 2009 GMT

Not After : Dec 10 14:32:49 2010 GMT

Subject: O=dutchgrid, O=users, O=nikhef, CN=Oscar Koeroo

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:

email:okoeroo@nikhef.nl

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

75:ef:19:f7:41:43:78:6b:32: ...

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----


MIIEhTCCA22gAwIS0sAK/qZIPIt0GA8iWQo ...

-----END CERTIFICATE-----

How do the sites know me (and I them)?

International Grid Trust Federation

- All research grid infrastructures share the same base set of trusted third parties ('CAs')
- There is typically one in each country
- The credentials they issue are comparable in quality



Requirements for (inter)national trust


- Identity vetting procedures
 - Based on (national) photo ID's
 - Face-to-face verification of applicants via a network of Registration Authorities
 - possible to trace the user in case of unlawful misconduct
 - Secure binding between the request and the identity vetting
 - Periodic renewal (once every year)
- Secure operation
 - off-line signing key or HSM-backed on-line secured systems
- Response to incidents
 - Timely revocation of compromised certificates

Single sign-on and delegation

- To authenticate with your certificate directly you would have to type a passphrase every time
- Also you need a way to send you *VOMS credentials* across
- In the Grid Security Infrastructure today, this is solved by *'proxy certificates'*
 - *a temporary key pair*
 - *in a temporary certificate signed by your 'long term' private key*
 - *valid for a limited time (default: 12 hours)*
 - *and itself not protected by a passphrase*



The grid-proxy-init tool

- User enters pass phrase, which is used to decrypt private key.
- Private key is used to sign a proxy certificate with its own, new public/private key pair.
 - User's private key not exposed after proxy has been signed




- Proxy placed in /tmp
 - the private key of the Proxy is *not* encrypted:
 - stored in local file: must be readable **only** by the owner;
 - proxy lifetime is short (typically 12 h) to minimize security risks.
- NOTE: No network traffic!

Daisy-chaining proxy delegation






User Job
Data processing, reading and writing remote files

Daisy-chaining proxy delegation



Registering with your VO




for LCG use:
<http://lcg-registrar.cern.ch/>

Agree to VO AUP!


VO affiliation

- Per-VO Authorisations (“visa”)
 - granted to a person or service by a virtual organisation
 - based on the ‘passport’ name
 - acknowledged by the resource owners
 - providers can still ban individual users, and decide which privileges are granted to which VO attributes
- In your case, these ‘visa’ are called **VOMS credentials**
- It is a cryptographically protected statement **by the VO**
- which is bound (by the VO) to your subject name



Embedding your VO affiliation

- The proxy can also be used as a *container* for other stuff
 - a 'plain' grid proxy does not indicate which VO you belong to
 - the VOMS credential is embedded as an *extension* in the proxy




```

VisionMaster:~ okoeroo$ voms-proxy-info -all
subject   : /O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Oscar Koeroo/CN=proxy
issuer    : /O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Oscar Koeroo
identity  : /O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Oscar Koeroo
type      : proxy
strength  : 1024 bits
path      : /tmp/x509up_u501
timeleft  : 11:59:30
=== VO dteam extension information ===
VO        : dteam
subject   : /O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Oscar Koeroo
issuer    : /DC=ch/DC=cern/OU=computers/CN=voms.cern.ch
attribute : /dteam/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
attribute : /dteam/ne/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
attribute : /dteam/ne/SE/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
attribute : /dteam/ne/SE/PDC/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
attribute : /dteam/ne/pdc/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
timeleft  : 11:59:40
uri       : voms.cern.ch:15004
  
```

Embedding your VO affiliation

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```
VisionMaster:~ okoeroo$ voms-proxy-info -all
subject   : /O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Oscar Koeroo/CN=proxy
issuer    : /O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Oscar Koeroo
identity  : /O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Oscar Koeroo
type      : proxy
strength  : 1024 bits
path      : /tmp/x509up_u501
timeleft  : 11:59:30
=== VO dteam extension information ===
VO        : dteam
subject   : /O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Oscar Koeroo
issuer    : /DC=ch/DC=cern/OU=computers/CN=voms.cern.ch
attribute : /dteam/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
attribute : /dteam/ne/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
attribute : /dteam/ne/SE/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
attribute : /dteam/ne/SE/PDC/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
attribute : /dteam/ne/pdc/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
timeleft  : 11:59:40
uri       : voms.cern.ch:15004
```


FQAN:
Fully Qualified Attribute Name




But what do users need to do?

- A Grid Security walk-through...


A walk-through




Certificate request




Certificate signing




Importing your certificate in the browser



Configuration on the Server



Using a Service



Intermediate summary

CA: authentication

VO: AUP, authorization and access

- new certificate: follow the web page instructions
- send to the appropriate CA (e.g. ca@dutchgrid.nl)
- save the answer
 - ~/.globus/usercert.pem
- import in web browser (.p12) and register with VO

- new proxy certificate:
 - **voms-proxy-init –voms dteam**
- *use the Grid :-)*

only
once
~daily

List of credentials as input for the Grid (other info skipped due to time constraint)

- Subject ID of your certificate
O=dutchgrid, O=users, O=nikhef, CN=Oscar Koeroo

- VO credentials

Those FQANs which specify project, (sub)group and role affiliation

/dteam/Role=VO-Admin

/dteam/Role=software-manager


- 1.All credentials are cryptographically tied to each user
- 2.VO credentials (VOMS) sits inside a proxy certificate



AuthZ & Mapping

The tools


Job Submission Today



Direct binding of payload and submitted grid job


- job contains all the user's business
- access control is done at the site's edge
- inside the site, the user job has a specific, site-local, system identity

Example CE workflow



A multi-authority world

> Authorization elements



Graphic: OGSA Working Group

Authorization based on Subject-ID & VOMS

- Lots of different tools, libs and frameworks
 - All read a special file called 'grid-mapfile' or something similar (like from a database)
 - All give a binary 'yes allowed' or 'no not allowed' before giving access to any type of resource
- You could be banned from a site or globally from the Grid

```
[...]
```

```
"/O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Jeffrey Templon"
```

```
"/O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Martijn Steenbakkers"
```

```
"/O=dutchgrid/O=users/O=nikhef/CN=Oscar Koeroo"
```

```
"/O=gridtutorial/O=users/O=grid-tutorial/CN=Grid pupil 20"
```

```
"/cms/muon"
```


```
"/atlas/Production"
```

```
"/atlas/*"
```

```
"/lhcb/*"
```


To the Unix world...

grid identity



"/O=dutch[...]/CN=Oscar Koeroo"
of group "/pvier"

translate

```
pvier001:x:43401:2029:PoolAccount VL-e P4 no.1:/home/pvier001:/bin/sh
```

1. Unix does not talk Grid, so translation is needed between grid and local identity
1. this translation has to happen somewhere
2. something needs to do that

Account mapping libraries and services

- Clusters are typically Unix systems
 - Unix systems have accounts and groups
uid=1001(okoeroo) gid=100(users) groups=16(cron)
- Mapping tools take the Subject-id and VOMS of the user and translate them to local Unix accounts
 - Per (sub)group affiliation
 - Per individual (bound to a group)
- People get mapped to poolaccounts
 - Poolaccounts are accounts unbound to a user at setup
 - Poolaccounts are assigned to users when they arrive at a site
 - Result:
 - Possible to track users on a cluster without ever meeting them in person



Stakkato

The New York Times

Internet Attack Called Broad and Long Lasting by Investigators

SAN FRANCISCO, May 9 – The incident seemed alarming enough: a breach of a Cisco Systems network in which an intruder seized programming instructions for many of the computers that control the flow of the Internet.

Now federal officials and computer security investigators have acknowledged that the Cisco break-in last year was only part of a more extensive operation – involving a single intruder or a small band, apparently based in Europe – in which thousands of computer systems were similarly penetrated. [...]

Attention is focused on a 16-year-old in Uppsala, Sweden. [...]

As the attacks were first noted in April 2004, a researcher [...] began to receive taunting e-mail messages from someone going by the name Stakkato [...]

Then, Nov 2007 and February 2008 ...

Teenager known as “Uppsala Hacker” with stealing Cisco’s source code

By [Janine de Blois](#)

February 15, 2008

The Swedish Court of Appeals has upheld the conviction of 19 year old from Uppsala for hacking into 3 Swedish Universities and the Swedish National Supercomputer Center in Linköping.



Cisco hacking suspect convicted in Sweden

The Associated Press

Published: November 19, 2007

STOCKHOLM, Sweden: A Swedish teenager who is suspected of hacking into the computer network of Cisco Systems Inc. in the U.S. was convicted Monday of intruding on the networks of three Swedish universities.

Overtuning an acquittal by a lower court, the Svea Court of Appeal gave the 19-year-old man a conditional sentence and ordered him to pay 160,000 kronor (US\$25,000; €17,000) in damages to the universities.

The man, who could not be named under Swedish privacy rules, said he would appeal.

The court found him guilty of breaching the systems of the universities in Linköping, Umeå and Uppsala in 2004.

He is also suspected of breaches at San Jose, California, based Cisco Systems. FBI agents came to Sweden last year to interrogate him in that case, he said, adding that he was innocent.

- [E-Mail Article](#)
- [Listen to Article](#)
- [Printer-Friendly](#)
- [3-Column Format](#)
- [Translate](#)
- [Share Article](#)
- [Text Size](#)

Is It Random: 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3

National Cyber-Alert System

Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2008-0166

Original release date: 05/13/2008

Last revised: 09/05/2008

Source: US-CERT/NIST

Static Link: <http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2008-0166>

Overview

OpenSSL 0.9.8c-1 up to versions before 0.9.8g-9 on Debian-based operating systems uses a random number generator that generates predictable numbers, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct brute force guessing attacks against cryptographic keys.

Impact

CVSS Severity (version 2.0):

CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.8 (HIGH) (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:N/A:N) (legend)

Impact Subscore: 6.9

Exploitability Subscore: 10.0

CVSS Version 2 Metrics:

Access Vector: Network exploitable

Access Complexity: Low

Authentication: Not required to exploit

Impact Type: Allows unauthorized disclosure of information

Only 163840 possible ssh keys!

```
int getRandomNumber()
{
    return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll.
             // guaranteed to be random.
}
```



More ssh

'XXXX-CERT-20080805'

MEMBERS LOGIN

LOADS.cc

- Home
- Price
- Stats
- Sign Up

Цены

Country	Price for 1k	
AU	300\$	Order now
DE	220\$	Order now
GB	210\$	Order now
IT	200\$	Order now
NZ	200\$	Order now
ES	200\$	Order now
US	110\$	Order now
BG	100\$	Order now
DK	100\$	Order now
FR	100\$	Order now
PT	100\$	Order now
NL	100\$	Order now
CA	80\$	Order now
JP	80\$	Order now
SE	70\$	Order now
BR	60\$	Order now
TR	60\$	Order now
NO	50\$	Order now
GR	50\$	Order now
PL	50\$	Order now
UA	40\$	Order now
RU	40\$	Order now
*	30\$	Order now

Октябрь 31/2007
Есть очень много юсы оптом , загрузки с трафа за подробностями стучим в аську.

Октябрь 26/2007
Налетай на ES IT DE , идёт хороший подлив.

Октябрь 23/2007
Введена принудительная проверка грузимых файлов на предмет палености , если файл палится более чем 30% из тестируемых 11 антивирусов , то загрузка данной задачи прекращается и рядом с ней появляется уведомление. Проверка файлов производится через приватный сервис.

Октябрь 16/2007
Налетай не скупись покупай живопИсь) а точнее микс и юсу.

Август 30/2007
Введена новая фича: ограничение количества загрузок в час , например грузить не более чем 200шт в час , актуально для соксов и иных ботов для поддержания одинакового среднесуточного количества онлайн.


Price for 1000 infected consumer computers:

AU: US\$ 300
US: US\$ 110
NL: US\$ 100

And grid systems are better connected than xDSL systems, so ...

<http://rbnexploit.blogspot.com/2007/11/rbn-76-service-team-loads-cc-and-their.html>

Incidents involving EGEE sites



But What About Containment?


Oops ... *ssh* keys

- do not expire
- cannot be revoked

Security And Availability For All Involved

Who are playing in the Grid Space, and thus: who get attacked?

- **Virtual Organisations or Communities: you and your colleagues**
- **Resource Centres and Grid Services: CPU, Storage, Data base and service providers central services and coordination**



So, where does that leave us?

Is the grid safe? You never know ...

- Strong authentication of users and resources by certificates
 - Exposure is time-limited and revocable
 - Community membership via secured 'visa'
 - Encrypted and integrity-protected communications

 - Grid and sites subject to policies, with data protection taken seriously,
commensurate with the open, scientific nature of the infrastructure

 - A vulnerability and risk assessment process to work on the software
 - Auditing and incident response teams across Europe and the Grids
- And you now know more-or-less how this works

But, as always, it remains a matter of *trust* ...

Grid Security Middleware mechanisms for protecting the e-Infrastructure

Questions...?



Bonus slides

Hydra key store theory, and SSSS

- > Keys are split for security and reliability reasons using Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (org.glite.security.ssss)
 - > standalone library and CLI
 - > modified Hydra service and Hydra client library/CLI
 - > the client contacts all services for key registration, retrieval and to change permissions
 - there is no synchronization or transaction coordinator service


```
$ glite-ssss-split-passwd -q 5 3 secret
```

```
137c9547aba101ef 6ee7adbbaacac1ef 1256bcc160eda592  
fdabc259cdfbacc9 3113be83f203d794
```


```
$ glite-ssss-join-passwd -q 137c9547aba101ef NULL \  
1256bcc160eda592 NULL 3113be83f203d794
```

```
secret
```

Storage layering and interfaces



DPM Architecture



Slides and graphics: 'ACLs in Light Weight Disk Pool Manager' MWSG 2006, Jean Philippe Baud, CERN