



Instrumenting Point-of-Sale Malware

A Case Study in Communicating Malware Analysis More Effectively

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Introduction

- The pragmatic and unapologetic offensive security guy
- Breaking things
- Reversing things
- Mississippi State University - NSA CAE Cyber Ops
- Enjoying my fourth year speaking at DEF CON



The Plan

- In general:
 - Adopt better practices in describing and demonstrating malware capabilities
 - Proposal to supplement written analyses with illustration that uses the malware itself
- What we'll spend a good chunk of today's session doing:
 - Showing off some cool instrumented POS malware
 - Talk about how you can do the same

Scientific Method

(the really important bits)

- Reproducibility
- Reasons:
 - Verifying results
 - Starting new analysis where old analysis left off
 - Education of new reverse engineering specialists
- IOC consumers vs. fellow analysts as an audience

What's often missing?

- Sample info
 - Hashes
 - **Availability**
- Procedure
 - Subverting malware-specific countermeasures
- Context
 - Redacted info on compromised hosts and C2 hosts
- Internal points of reference
 - Addresses of functionality/data being discussed

Devil's Advocate: Why it's not there...

- Fellow analysts and students are not the target audience of many published analyses
 - We're left to "pick" through for technically useful info
- Added effort - It's a lot of work to get your internal notes and tools fit for outside consumption
- Analysis-consumer safety - *preventing* the reader for inadvertently infecting
- Client confidentiality - Compelling. May be client-specific data in targeted malware
- Competitive advantage - public relations, advertising services, showcase of technical ability
 - Perhaps not in our best interest to allow someone to further it, do it better, or worse: prove it wrong.

What's Being Done Elsewhere?

- Reproducibility and verifiability are a big deal in any academic/scientific endeavor
- Peer review is *supposed* to act as the filter here
 - (Though maybe we aren't as rigorous as we ought to be with it in computer science/engineering)
- Software, environment, data, documented to the point that someone can recreate the experiment
- *Executable/interactive research paper*
 - Embedded algorithms and data,
 - (Doesn't that sound a bit scary re: Malware? :))

Recommendations

- Beyond sandbox output...
- Sample availability (!!!!!!!!!)
- virusshare.com is the best positive example of the right direction here
- Host environment documentation
- Target data - give it something to exfiltrate
- Network environment - give it *what it wants* to talk to
- **Instrumentation** - programmatic, running commentary
 - Scriptable debugging (winappdbg!)
 - Isolate functionality, document points of interest, put it all into a big picture



Case Study:
JackPOS

(to make sure I get these in before we geek-out on the demo)

Acknowledgements

- Samples - @xylit0l - <http://cybercrime-tracker.net>
- Prior-to-now-but-post-this-work analyses
 - <http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2014/02/jackpos-the-house-always-wins.html>
 - <http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2014/02/cyber-intelligence-jackpos-behind-screen.html>
- Please check the white paper citations for tools, executable paper prior work, etc.

Why JackPOS?

- Current concern surrounding POS malware
- C2 availability - Ability to demonstrate a complete environment
 - From card-swipe to command-and-control
- C++ strings, STL - runtime objects make static analysis with IDA Pro a bit more awkward
- Good use case for harnesses
 - Independent memory-search functionality

Harness Design

- WinAppDbg - Python scriptable debugging
 - *Really* fun library - Well-documented, lots of examples, easy to use
- Callbacks for breakpoints

```
breakpoints = [(0x00401B38, patch_cnc),
               (0x00408FE8, patch_install_check),
               (0x0040B796, shell_execute_blocker),
               (0x00402F84, open_url),
               (0x0040320A, cnc_online),
               (0x00403321, cnc_online_end),
               (0x004035BC, cnc_send),
               (0x00403627, cnc_recv),
               (0x00409388, search_process),
               (0x004099FE, process_kill),
               (0x00408DAC, kill_block_registry_cleanup),
               (0x004095E6, process_update),
               (0x00409CA7, process_exec),
               ]
```

```
def patch_cnc(event):
    """
    Breakpoint: 0x00401B38
    Patch the CnC to ours
    """
    process, thread, context = get_state(event)
    original_cnc = process.peek_string(0x004339BC)
    process.write(0x004339BC, debug_cnc+'\x00')
    print_modification('Modified CnC from %s to %s' % (original_cnc, debug_cnc))

    esp = context['Esp']
    process.write_dword(esp+0x04, len(debug_cnc));
    print_modification('  Patched length to %i' % (len(debug_cnc)))

    return
```

JackPOS

- Example sample - SHA1
9fa9364add245ce873552aced7b4a757dceceb9e
- Available on virusshare (and mcgrewsecurity.com)
- This is the only part *not* on the DEF CON DVD.
- Command and Control
 - PHP, Yii Framework

Commmand and Control

JackPos

Welcome, badguy@localhost
Logout

Home page
View all general information you need.

Dumps
Check all dumps.

Bots
Manage all bots.

Settings
Change account's settings.

Statistics

New bots (last 24 h)	0	Total bots	0
Alive bots (last 24 h)	0	Productive bots	0
Productive bots (last 24 h)	0	Online bots	0
New dumps (last 24 h)	0	Online productive bots	0
		Total dumps	0


- Data model - bots, cards, commmands, dumps, ranges, tracks, users

Back to the sample

- UPX (thankfully not an unpacking talk/tutorial)
 - Unpacked version crashes due the stack cookie seed address not relocating
 - Easy fix: disable ASLR (also makes our analysis easier), unset:
 - IMAGE_NT_HEADERS >
IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER >
IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE


Setup

- String setup - c2, executable filenames, process names for memory search
- Installation (copying self)/persistence (registry)
- Harness patches -
 - Command and control
 - Installation check
 - Prevents watchdog process (and anything else from ShellExecute'ing)



Communication

- Command and Control Check-in
 - Checks C2 for `http://[c2]/post_echo`
 - (PostController.php responds “up”)
 - Prevents simple sandbox from getting much
 - If there’s track data, base64 it and send it
 - Harness configured to display data sent
 - Check command queue
- Hosts uniquely identify by MAC




Commands

- Credit card track theft happens without having to be commanded to do so
- Remainder of command set is simple:
 - kill
 - update - (replace current install with latest from /post/download)
 - exec <url>

Scraping Memory

- Get a list of functions
 - No 64-bit process
 - No processes matching internal table (system, etc)
- Iterate and search for card data using two regular-expression-esque functions
 - ISO/IEC 7813 (we can generate and instrument this)
- Harness identifies search process
- Another harness can be used to instrument the code to scan arbitrary PIDs



Demo

- Sample MD5 - aa9686c3161242ba61b779aa325e9d24
- Harnesses
 - jackpos_harness.py - Instruments all operation
 - search_proc_harness.py - Skips to and illustrates track-data capture
- Track data generator - Generate and hold card swipes in memory
- PHP source for (actual) C2
 - (recreated DB schema (uh it works))

Wrapping up

- Addressing reproducibility/verifiability, potential benefits
 - Effective illustration for lay audiences, students
 - Base to work from (not “from scratch”) for other analysts
- Illustration using the resources malware “wants”, vs. generic sandbox
- Potential for publishing instrumented analysis in virtual/cloud environments for others to work with more immediately



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