

Meddle: Framework for piggy-back fuzzing and tool development

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Types of Fuzzing

File Format Fuzzing

- PDF, Microsoft Word, or TrueType fonts

Protocol Fuzzing

- RDP, VNC, SSL, or Voip

Application Fuzzing

- COM objects, API calls, or inter-process communication

Web Application Fuzzing

- Joomla, WordPress, or any website

Fuzzing Tools

SPIKE from Immunity [1]

- Network protocols and web applications

Basic Fuzzing Framework (BFF) from CERT [2]

- File format

SAGE from Microsoft [3]

- Input fuzzing

AutoFuzz [4]

- Network protocols by MITM

COMRaider [5]

- COM interface fuzzing

IOCtrlFuzzer from eSage Lab [6]

- NtDeviceloControlFile driver input fuzzing

Fuzzing Algorithms

Basic algorithms:



- Naive protocol fuzzing (eg. IOCtrlFuzzer [6])
- Protocol aware fuzzing (eg. SPIKE [1])

Advanced algorithms:

- Protocol-learning before fuzzing (eg. Autofuzz [4])
- Feedback-driven fuzzing (eg. Sage [3])
- Code coverage fuzzing (eg. Google's Flash fuzzing [7])

File Format Fuzzing: TrueType

Base TrueType Font (eg. arial.ttf)




Blind-Fuzzed TrueType Fonts

Install Each
Font


Render
Each Font

BSOD?

Protocol Fuzzing: RDP by Network MITM



Protocol Fuzzing: RDP by Client Implementation



Protocol Fuzzing: RDP by File Fuzzing

Luigi Auriemma's CVE-2012-0002 POC


```
nc SERVER 3389 < termdd_1.dat
```

- RDP server use after free

Application Fuzzing: API Fuzzing Example

instruder's CVE-2012-0181 related POC win32k.sys

```
NtUserLoadKeyboardLayoutEx( hFile,
0x0160,0x01AE,&uKerbordname, hKbd, &uStr, 0x666, 0x101 )
```



Meddle: About

Meddle:

- Open source, <https://github.com/glmcdona/meddle>
- Relatively new project
- Windows only, sorry :(
- Command-line based
- Supports x86, WOW64, and x64 processes
- Framework written in C#
- IronPython for the environment

Meddle: Goals


Goals:

- Bring simplicity to fuzzing
- Python for the fuzzing environment
- Extendibility
- Reproducibility


For Simplicity:

- Piggy-back on existing application

Meddle: Structure




Meddle: Structure



- Equal amount of time on each event type

Target

Meddle Project (IronPython)



Target

```
class Target_Winsock_Send(TargetBase):  
  
    def __init__(self, Engine, ProcessBase):  
        # Set options and hook filters  
  
    def breakpoint_hit(self, event_name, address, context, th):  
        # Parse arguments and return fuzz blocks for each event
```

Target `__init__`

```
def __init__(self, Engine, ProcessBase):
    self.Engine = Engine
    self.ProcessBase = ProcessBase
    self.hook_exports = True    # Hook matching exports
    self.hook_symbols = False   # Don't hook matching symbols

    # Libraries to look at
    self.libraries = ["ws2_32.dll"]
    self.libraries_regex = re.compile("a^",re.IGNORECASE)

    # List of function names to add hooks on.
    self.functions = ["send"]
    self.functions_regex = re.compile("a^",re.IGNORECASE)
```

Target breakpoint_hit

```
def breakpoint_hit(self, event_name, address,
                  context, th):
    parameters = [ ... parameter spec ... ]

    [reg_spec, stack_spec] = self.ProcessBase.types.pascal(
                                                parameters )

    arguments = self.Engine.ParseArguments(stack_spec, reg_spec,
                                           context)

    if self.ProcessBase.verbose:
        print arguments.ToString()

    return [arguments.GetFuzzBlockDescriptions(),
            "Winsock Send Event"]
```

Target Parameters

```
parameters = [ {"name": "socket",
                "size": self.ProcessBase.types.size_ptr(),
                "type": None, "fuzz": NOFUZZ },

                {"name": "buffer",
                "size": self.ProcessBase.types.size_ptr(),
                "type": self.ProcessBase.types.parse_BUFFER,
                "type_args": "size", "fuzz": NOFUZZ },

                {"name": "size",
                "size": self.ProcessBase.types.size_ptr(),
                "type": None, "fuzz": NOFUZZ },

                {"name": "flags",
                "size": self.ProcessBase.types.size_ptr(),
                "type": None, "fuzz": NOFUZZ } ]
```

Target Parameter Structures

```

parameters = [ ...
    {"name": "buffer",
     "size": self.ProcessBase.types.size_ptr(),
     "type": self.ProcessBase.types.parse_BUFFER,
     "type_args": "size", "fuzz": NOFUZZ }, ... ]

def parse_BUFFER(self, parent, address, extra_name, type_args):
    if type(type_args) is str: # points to argument name
        size = parent.GetMemberSearchUp(type_args).ToInt()
    else: # contains exact size
        size = type_args
    return [ {"name": extra_name + "BUFFER",
             "size": size,
             "type": None, "fuzz": FUZZ } ]

```

Target Arguments

```
arguments = self.Engine.ParseArguments(...)
print arguments.ToString()
```

flags at r9:

00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

.....

size at r8:

13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

.....

buffer at rdx:

E0 98 68 04 00 00 00 00

..h.....

buffer.BUFFER at 0x46898E0:

03 00 00 13 0E E0 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 08 00 03
00 00 00

.....

...

socket at rcx:

58 07 00 00 00 00 00 00

X.....

returnAddress at 0x25AF918:



Target Arguments

```
arguments = self.Engine.ParseArguments(...)
print "Sent size = %i" % arguments.size.ToInt()
print arguments.buffer.ToString()
```

Sent size = 19

buffer at rdx:

90 ED 29 04 00 00 00 00

..).....

buffer.BUFFER at 0x429ED90:

03 00 00 13 0E E0 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 08 00 03

.....

00 00 00

...

Target breakpoint_hit

```
arguments = self.Engine.ParseArguments(...)
print "Sent size = %i" % arguments.size.ToInt()
print arguments.buffer.BUFFER.ToString()
```

Sent size = 19

buffer.BUFFER at 0x4907480:

```
03 00 00 13 0E E0 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 08 00 03  .....
00 00 00  .....
```


Sent size = 428

buffer.BUFFER at 0x4907480:

```
03 00 01 AC 02 F0 80 7F 65 82 01 A0 04 01 01 04  ..... e.....
01 01 01 01 FF 30 19 02 01 22 02 01 02 02 01 00  ....0.. .".....
02 01 01 02 01 00 02 01 01 02 02 FF FF 02 01 02  .....
30 19 02 01 01 02 01 01 02 01 01 02 01 01 02 01  0.....
00 02 01 01 02 02 04 20 02 01 02 30 1C 02 02 FF  ..... ...0....
FF 02 02 FC 17 02 02 FF FF 02 01 01 02 01 00 02  .....
01 01 02 02 FF FF 02 01 02 04 82 01 3F 00 05 00  ..... ?...
14 7C 00 01 81 36 00 08 00 10 00 01 C0 00 44 75  .|...6.. .....Du
63 61 81 28 01 C0 D8 00 04 00 08 00 80 07 38 04  ca.(....<.....8.  ↵ 🔍
```


Process

Meddle Project (IronPython)



Process

```
class ProcessRdp(ProcessBase):
    def __init__(self, controller, crashdump_folder,
                 breakpoint_handler, pid, unique_identifier,
                 verbose):
        # Specific options
        self.path_to_exe = b"C:\\\\Windows\\System32\\mstsc.exe"
        self.command_line = b"mstsc.exe /v:192.168.110.134"

        # Initialize
        self.initialize(...)


    def on_debugger_attached(self, Engine):
        # Attach the targets to the process
        ...
```

Process

```
def on_debugger_attached(self, Engine):  
    # Set the types  
    self.Engine = Engine  
    self.types = meddle_types(Engine)  
  
    # Add the targets  
    #Engine.AddTarget(Target_RDP_RC4)  
    Engine.AddTarget(Target_Winsock_Send)  
  
    # Handle process loaded  
    Engine.HandleProcessLoaded()  
  
    # Resume the process. Was created suspended.  
    if self.start_th >= 0:  
        windll.kernel32.ResumeThread(self.start_th);
```

Controller

Meddle Project (IronPython)



Controller Measurement Instance

```
# Perform an initial measurement
mBreakpoint = BreakpointMeasurement()
mProcess = ProcessRdp(self, "C:\\\\Crash\\", mBreakpoint,
                      -1, 0, True )
self.CEngine.AttachProcess(mProcess)
sleep(5)
measurements = mBreakpoint.measurement
mProcess.stop()
```

Controller Measurement Instance

```
class BreakpointMeasurement:
    def __init__(self):
        self.measurement = []


    def breakpoint_hit(self, parent, target, event_name,
                      address, context, th):
        [fuzz_blocks, fuzz_name] = target.breakpoint_hit(event_name,
                                                         address, context, th)

        if fuzz_blocks != None:
            # Record the possible attack
            self.measurement += [[target.__class__.__name__,
                                fuzz_name, len(fuzz_blocks)]]
```


Controller Attack Instance

```
breakpointSeed = self.generator.randint(1,10000000)
newBreakpoint = BreakpointAttack(5, attackEventNumber,
                                attackEventName, breakpointSeed )
newProcess = ProcessNotepad(self, "C:\\Crash\\", newBreakpoint,
                             -1, uniqueId, False )
self.CEngine.AttachProcess(newProcess)
uniqueId+=1
```


XRDP Demo 1 Diagram




XRDP Demo 1

Demo 1:

- https://github.com/glmcdona/meddle/tree/master/examples/example_mstsc
- Fuzz `ws2_32.dll::send()` calls from rdp client during connection
- Success: Crash of XRDP server

RC4 Encryption



RC4 Encryption

```
class Target_PrintSymbols(TargetBase):
    def __init__(self, Engine, ProcessBase):
        ...
        self.hook_symbols = True # Hook pdb symbols
        self.libraries = ["mstscax.dll"]
        ...
        self.functions_regex = re.compile(".*",re.IGNORECASE)
        ...

    def breakpoint_hit(self, event_name, address, context, th):
        print event_name
        return [[],[]]
```

RC4 Encryption

...

mstscax.dll::rc4

mstscax.dll::?SendBuffer@CMCS@@UEAAJPEAVITSNetBuffer@@KKKKK@Z

mstscax.dll::?SendBuffer@CTSX224Filter@@UEAAJPEAVITSNetBuffer@@KKKKK@Z

...

mstscax.dll::?RunQueueEvent@CTSThread@@IEAAJPEAVCTSMsg@@@Z

mstscax.dll::?OnTDFlushSendQueue@CTD@@QEAAJPEAVITSAsyncResult@@_K@Z

Sent at 0x4D00EF4:


03 00 00 60 02 F0 80 64	00 01 03 EB 70 52 08 00	... '...dpR..
00 00 F4 31 42 EF BD FA	21 3D 36 D1 4C 71 CB 91	...1B...	!=6.Lq..
CA 03 DB B2 A9 9D B5 86	52 A1 F6 4D 5E 6E C7 8D	R..M^n..
67 B4 D2 53 BE C5 B5 55	98 1C 45 31 13 0A DD CF	g..S...U	..E1....
06 37 6B 69 C6 60 EF A3	C1 EC F6 AB E5 70 96 73	.7ki.'..p.s
32 9B 4E ED 7D 40 0E A4	C7 20 F2 A3 69 15 0F 9A	2.N.}@..	. .i...

RC4 Encryption

```
class Target_RDP_RC4(TargetBase):
    def __init__(self, Engine, ProcessBase):
        ...
        self.hook_symbols = True # Hook pdb symbols
        self.libraries = ["mstscax.dll"]
        ...
        self.functions = ["rc4"]
        ...

def breakpoint_hit(self, event_name, address, context, th):
    parameters = [ ... ]
    [reg_spec, stack_spec] = self.ProcessBase.types.pascal( para
    arguments = self.Engine.ParseArguments(stack_spec, reg_spec,
    return [arguments.GetFuzzBlockDescriptions(), "RC4 buffer"]
```

XRDP Demo 2 Diagram



XRDP Demo 2

Demo 2:

- https://github.com/glmcdona/meddle/tree/master/examples/example_mstsc
- Fuzz `ws2_32.dll::rc4()` calls from rdp client during connection
- Success: Crash of XRDP server

Received Data More Complicated

```
def breakpoint_hit(self, event_name, address, context, th):
    if event_name == "ws2_32.dll::recv":
        ...
        self.Engine.AddBreakpoint(self,
            arguments.returnAddress.ToPtr(), "return")
        self.buffers[str(th)] = arguments
        ...
    elif event_name == "return":
        ...
        # Parse the return value and read output buffer
        ...
```

Vulnerabilities

XRDP v0.60 and below vulnerable. Some RCE before authentication:

- Buffer-overflow in `xrdp_mcs_rcv_connect_initial()`
- Out-of-bounds bitmap cache reference
`xrdp_cache_add_bitmap()`
- Large `num_events` causes information disclosure and DOS conditions
- Number of channels attack
`xrdp_sec_process_mcs_data_channels()`

Vulnerabilities

```
static int APP_CC xrdp_mcs_rcv_connect_initial(  
    struct xrdp_mcs* self)  
{  
    int len;  
    struct stream* s;  
    init_stream(s, 8192); // Fixed size buffer  
    ...  
    // Overflow. 'len' controlled, copied to fixed buffer  
    out_uint8a(self->client_mcs_data, s->p, len);  
}
```

DeviceIoControl

```
BOOL WINAPI DeviceIoControl(HANDLE hDevice,  
                             DWORD dwIoControlCode, LPVOID lpInBuffer,  
                             DWORD nInBufferSize, LPVOID lpOutBuffer,  
                             DWORD nOutBufferSize, LPDWORD lpBytesReturned,  
                             lpOverlapped);
```

- Communication to kernel-mode
- Control code to device driver
- Input and output buffer
- eg. low level disk read/write

Devices Communication

Run Notepad → Save As → Network:

Number of events being attacked by name:

```
728    \??\Nsi
64     \??\MountPointManager
20     \Device\LanmanDatagramReceiver
16     \Device\KsecDD
12     \Device\Afd\Endpoint
6      \??\C:
6      \??\NvAdminDevice
4      \??\C:\Users
4      \DEVICE\NETBT_TCPIP_{09AEF42F-B3C7-4854-B4FB-D673B5AD51D5}
4      \??\C:\Users\glmcadona\Documents\Visual Studio 2012\Projects
4      \??\C:\Users\glmcadona\Documents
4      \DEVICE\NETBT_TCPIP_{225A69B0-2055-4DF4-87CB-F3AC50134FE2}
4      \DEVICE\NETBT_TCPIP_{8386C8AD-BABB-4F8E-B85F-3D56FC700D9A}
4      \DEVICE\NETBT_TCPIP_{146BFC43-FB56-4EB3-98D6-E72912BF265E}
```

Demo 3

Using Meddle to dump (or attack) DeveloControl:

- https://github.com/glmcdona/meddle/tree/master/examples/example_deviceiocontrol
- ntdll.dll::NtDeveloControlFile
- Device handle to name mapping via create hooks
- Dealing with more complex argument types
- Capturing return values/output buffers

Malware Sandbox: Demo 4

Simple sandbox:

- https://github.com/glmcdona/meddle/tree/master/examples/example_sandbox
- Process forking
- Traces
- File read/writes
- Registry changes
- Network activity

Conclusion

Thanks for attending!

- <https://github.com/glmcdona/meddle>
- Contributors welcome
- Testers needed
- glmcdona@gmail.com

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